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and worse accountants. (Debate on the introduction of the Public Accountants Registration Act, New 
South Wales Parliament, 1944, p. 856) Both the state and the professions have an important interest in 
safeguarding the quality of service and the protection of the public with respect to the provision of 
professional services. In the main, the states focus on professional performance and accountability, and 
the professions emphasise the maintenance of quality and improvement in the skills of members. With 
respect to the accounting profession the state has taken two basic approaches to improving professional 
performance and accountability. The first approach, through imposed competencies embedded in various 
state registration Acts, regulates a minimum level of performance. The second approach addresses the 
issue of accountability through the imposition of specific standards of conduct, sanctions and reporting 
requirements ... 
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There are such persons as liars, damned liars and experts, and there are accountants, bad 
accountants, and worse accountants. (Debate on the introduction of the Public Accountants 
Registration Act, New South Wales Parliament, 1944, p. 856) 
 
Both the state and the professions have an important interest in safeguarding the 
quality of service and the protection of the public with respect to the provision of 
professional services. In the main, the states focus on professional performance and 
accountability, and the professions emphasise the maintenance of quality and 
improvement in the skills of members. 
 
With respect to the accounting profession the state has taken two basic approaches to 
improving professional performance and accountability. The first approach, through 
imposed competencies embedded in various state registration Acts, regulates a 
minimum level of performance. The second approach addresses the issue of 
accountability through the imposition of specific standards of conduct, sanctions and 
reporting requirements. A recent example of this approach is the decision, in April 
2004 by the Singapore government to introduce the Accounting and Corporate 
Regulatory Authority, through the amalgamation of the Register of Companies and 
Businesses and the Public Accountants Board. This authority is responsible for 
administering the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Act (2004) and represents a 
proactive move by government away from professional self-regulation following the 
many accounting scandals of recent times, such as Enron and WorldCom. However, 
the perceived need for government regulation is not new. State regulating authorities 
exist in most (if not all) the states in the United States (for example, the Accountants 
Board of Ohio, Nevada State Board of Accountancy, the Board of Public 
Accountancy in Massachusetts), and central regulating authorities also exist, for 
example in the Republic of South Africa (the Public Accountants, and Auditors 
Board). In countries where a regulating authority does not exist (for example, in the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia) the professional accounting bodies 
have been lobbying (to date without success) for regulation.  
 
To protect the public the professions require members to undertake continuing 
professional development programs, and impose a system of certification on members 
engaged in public practice. These programs generally require skills be demonstrated 
at levels higher than the competency requirements necessary for registration. Most 
professional bodies also enforce strict self-regulation requirements to discipline 
delinquent members. Thus one might expect that in Australia an ‘accountant’ is a 
person of integrity, professional competence and has adequate indemnity cover. 
Unfortunately this is not the case, because currently there is no legal impediment in 
Australia preventing any person, of whatever qualifications and experience, from 
presenting themselves to the public as an accountant. This chapter considers the 
paradoxical case of the Australian accounting profession in New South Wales, which 
was once government regulated, but lobbied successfully to remove this regulation 
and more recently attempted, without success, to reinstate it. The chapter focuses on 
this regulatory vacuum and the impact, in terms of protection of, and redresses by, the 




Three general theories explain regulation that limits professional licensing of 
accountants: capture theory, public interest theory and, at a general level, political 
economy theory. While these theories are well known in the professional regulation 
literature, a brief overview is provided for background.  
 
Capture theory, in its simplest form is a straightforward application of self-interest. 
Accounting professionals ‘capture’ the regulations, or the regulator, governing 
licensing and structure them to limit the supply of accountants and thereby increase 
their incomes. 
 
Public interest theory, by contrast, suggests that professional licensing occurs due to 
some market ‘failure’, and that its intent is to increase the welfare to society. Public 
interest theory presumes that, due to the complex nature of the service and uncertainty 
about the efficacy of competent service, consumers of professional services lack 
complete information about the quality of such services. Public interest theory asserts 
that the professional licensing corrects this market deficiency by ensuring that 
accounting professionals are of a sufficiently high and standard quality. 
 
Political economy theory, in contrast to both capture theory and public interest 
theory, entertains the possibility that both the public and accounting professionals 
affect the existence and form of accounting professional licensing regulations. 
Political economy theory is basically a theory of checks and balances. 
 
Government Regulation and General Public Protection  
This study asks why the accounting profession in Australia is the only group of 
professionals offering services to the public which is not regulated by either state or 
Commonwealth legislation.  
 
The Public Accountants Registration Act 1945 received assent in the New South 
Wales (NSW) Parliament on 5 April 1945. It had two major purposes: to provide for 
the audit of certain accounts by registered public accountants, and to regulate the 
qualifications for registration as a registered public accountant. Under the Act, a 
‘public accountant’ was defined as:  
an accountant who maintains an office as a principal either alone or with 
others for the business of General Accountancy and the auditing of accounts 
and in that office places his services in any such regard at the disposal of the 
public generally for remuneration and whose services are not either entirely or 
mainly at the disposal of any individual firm, trust or association. (Public 
Accountants Registration Act 1945, p. 107) [emphasis added] 
 
The Act was quite clear that its purpose included protecting the public interest, 
specifically the offering of accounting services to the general public, in addition to the 
wider arena of auditing. 
 
To achieve this protection, the Act clearly set out the qualifications necessary for 
registration, which included: being over 21 years of age, being of good fame and 
character, having passed prescribed examinations and acquired practical experience in 
accountancy, or be the holder of a certificate of membership issued by an approved 
institute of accountants, or having passed the final examinations of any approved 
institute of accountants. To ensure compliance with the requirements and the spirit of 
the Act, specific disciplinary provisions were included. These required that a 
complaint or charge against any registered public accountant of infamous misconduct 
as a public accountant be referred to the Public Accountants Registration Board for 
investigation. The board was empowered to conduct any inquiry, investigation or 
hearing, and hold any such inquiry, investigation or hearing in open court. Where the 
public accountant was judged guilty, the board could choose to reprimand or caution 
him, suspend his registration, or direct that his name be removed from the register 
(Public Accountants Registration Act 1945, pp. 117–118).  
 
So intent was the Act on protecting the specialist title of ‘public accountant’ 
and the public interest and enforcing the educational and practical requirements 
of registration, that it prescribed penalties for persons posing as a registered 
public accountant without registration: 
… either alone or having regard to the circumstances in which it is taken or 
used indicates or is capable of being understood to indicate or is calculated to 
lead persons to infer that he is a registered public accountant shall be guilty of 
an offence …. (Public Accountants Registration Act 1945, p. 120). [emphasis 
added] 
 
This provision meant that only accountants registered under the Act could undertake 
accounting work on behalf of the general public, and the specialist title was protected 
by legislation. 
 
Creation of the Public Accountants Registration (PAR) Act 
Three theories underpin the conceptual framework used in this chapter to examine the 
creation and implementation (in 1945) and dissolution (in 1989) of the PAR Act: 
public interest theory, political economy theory, and capture theory. The conceptual 







The desire of the NSW government to regulate is supported by Mitnick’s (1980, p. 
20) definition of regulation as ‘the intentional restriction of a subject’s choice of 
activity, by an entity not directly party to or involved in that activity’. Merino and 
Mayper (2001) provide a more theoretical description of regulation as that which 
results in the redistribution of economic resources among various competing interest 
groups through the use of state power.  
 
The key objective of the theories of economic regulation is to explain who will be 
positively, and who negatively, impacted by the regulation (Stigler, 1971). Roberts 
and Kurtenbach (1998) contend that the public interest theory, political economy 
theory, and capture theory of regulation explain state intervention in the economy. 
Roberts and Kurtenbach (1998) provide the example of the Model Accountancy Act 
developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 1981. They 
argue that regulation of the public accounting profession is desirable because the 
public makes critical decisions based on the financial statements examined by public 
accountants, the public relies on their competence, and the public cannot be 
reasonably expected to investigate the underlying qualifications of each accountant. 
 
 
The Conceptual Framework of Change 

















Public Interest Theory 
Public interest theory proposes that regulation maintains and protects the public. 
Regulation of industry and organisations protects and benefits all of society (Deegan, 
2005; Stigler, 1971). The public needs protection through regulation because when 
economic markets are left alone they are unlikely to operate efficiently (Posner, 
1974).While Roberts and Kurtenbach (1998, p. 211) conclude that the ‘existence of a 
market imperfection is sufficient rationale for government intervention’. The debate 
and discussion in 1944 and 1945 reveals that the NSW Government believed that the 
PAR Act was based primarily on the protection of the public. For example, the 
Assistant Minister who introduced the Bill, Mr Evatt, declared ‘(T)he chief merit of 
the measure is that the public will be protected’ (NSW Parliament, 1944, p. 855). His 
view was supported, but described somewhat disrespectfully by Mr Sheahan MLA, as 
‘a bill for the purpose of protecting the public against quackery and dishonesty in 
accountancy’ (NSW Parliament, 1944, p. 858) 
 
This theme is repeated throughout the various readings and debates: however, over 
time, other ‘reasons’ for the Bill were also put forward. For example, ‘the first 
consideration is the protection of the public and the second is the protection of the 
practitioner or the would-be practitioner’ (NSW Parliament, 1944, p. 857), a view first 
introduced by Mr Williams MLA, who also happened to be an accountant. Later in 
the debate Mr Evatt explained that ‘the Government desires to place a measure on the 
statute book, not only to protect the public, which is its primary purpose, but also to 
give to the accountancy profession the prestige and importance that it now lacks’ 
(NSW Parliament, 1945, p. 1764) 
 
Political Economy Theory 
Political economy theory postulates that economic regulation protects the private 
interests of politically effective groups, in this instance, the professional accounting 
bodies (Deegan, 2005; Posner, 1974). This theory explains the majority of the debate 
and discussion that the Opposition used during the introduction, and up to the 
adoption of the Bill. For example Lieutenant-Colonel Bruxner of the Country Party 
argued that ‘the profession itself should have majority representation on the [PAR] 
board’ (NSW Parliament, 1945, p. 1756). This view was supported by his colleague 
Mr Brain, who suggested ‘most emphatically that the accountancy profession, which 
has done an excellent job over the years, should have a preponderance of 
representation on the board’ (NSW Parliament, 1945, p. 1806).  
 
One of the main roles of the Public Accountants Registration Board (PARB) was to 
set the standard of qualifications necessary for registration as a Public Accountant. Mr 
Brain and Lieutenant-Colonel Bruxner, among others, constantly argued that the 
majority of members on the board should come from the profession. Their position is 
consistent with Stigler’s (1971) assertion that every occupation that has the enough 
political strength will seek to control the regulator.  
 
Capture Theory 
This theory contends that regulated parties will capture the regulatory mechanism, in 
this case the accounting profession and the PARB (Mitnick, 1980). Both Mr Brain 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Bruxner argue that such an event ‘capture’ is preferable. This 
confirms Deegan’s (2005, p. 115) view that ‘regulated parties seek to take charge of 
(capture) the regulator so that the rules that are subsequently released (post-capture) 
will be advantageous to the parties subject to the requirements of the rules’. The 
Opposition’s discussion is an example of the theory defined by Laffont and Tirole 
(1991, p. 1089) whereby regulation ‘is acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit’. 
 
Mitnick (1980) identifies two events which show that an organisation has ‘captured’ 
its regulatory mechanisms. The capture events relevant to the PARB are where the 
regulated organisation, the accountancy profession, has control over the regulation 
and the regulatory body. The second relevant event is where the activities of the 
organisations coordinate the regulatory body’s activities. The debate and discussion of 
the Bill shows that the accounting profession had the potential to capture the regulator 
in due course. Even though the Opposition amendment to change the structure of the 
board (from two to three members from the profession) failed, two of the remaining 
three members were the Auditor General and the Under Secretary of the Treasury, 
both generally trained and qualified accountants. The only possible non-accountant on 
the PARB would have been the chairman. Even though the Bill had passed with only 
two members of the PARB to be from the profession, the Board would likely have 
contained predominantly accountants. Regulatory capture was probably expected in 
the drafting and development of the Bill. This conclusion dovetails with Walker’s 
(1987, p. 281) finding that ‘the general literature on “regulation” is replete with 
allusions to the tendency for regulatory agencies to be “captured” by the interest 
groups and thereafter to operate in the interest of those elements of the community 
that the agencies were established to regulate’. 
 
The Removal of General Public Protection 
From 1945 to 1989 the general public of New South Wales was protected by the 
provisions of the Public Accountants Registration Act, and through this had a 
mechanism that ensured an acceptable level of competency. While the profession did 
capture the regulatory body, the regulator could still protect the public interest. It also 
provided some reassurance that every accountant offering an accounting service to the 
public was so registered, and that this registration (and therefore the ability to 
practice) could be removed for infamous misconduct. However, from 1989 onwards, 
this protection of the general public was removed with the adoption of the Public 
Accountants Registration (Repeal and Amendment) Act, 1989. 
 
Deficiency was well known in the accounting profession, as evidenced by a statement 
made by a senior advisor of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia when 
addressing the Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities in 2001. In response 
to a question on licensing from a member of the Committee, the ICAA representative 
responded:  
Senator Cooney, you could be, and call yourself, an accountant if you wanted 
to. If you were going to charge to prepare a tax return you would have to be 
licensed and registered. If you wanted to audit companies you would have to 
be registered, but if you wanted to provide very sophisticated financial advice, 
very sophisticated taxation advice, there is no licensing requirement. 
(Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Papers, 2001, p. ??) [emphasis 
added] 
 
The purpose of the repeal Act, it was claimed, was to remove the parallel system of 
registration of auditors in New South Wales, specifically, the registration of company 
auditors under the then Companies Act and registration under the Public Accountants 
Registration Act. It was stated in the parliamentary debate that the dual system was 
‘an unnecessary burden and a costly duplication of effort’ (NSW Parliament, 1989a, 
p. 6318). It was also argued that the need to obtain registration in New South Wales as 
a registered public accountant stemmed solely from the requirements of various state 
Acts, which required audits to be carried out by a registered public accountant. 
Further, the then Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs, claimed that the repeal 
legislation was consistent with the government’s policy of removing unnecessary 
regulation and duplication where it was in the public interest to do so. This 
completely overlooked that the public interest extended to the general public and was 
not limited to public companies, large private companies or statutory authorities. The 
parliamentary debate also referred to the fact that both the professional bodies 
associated with accounting (the then Australian Society of Accountants 
and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia) supported the repeal Bill. For 
example, Mr Dowd NSW Attorney General stated ‘the proposal to repeal the Act is 
supported by the Australian Society of Accountants, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants and the Public Accountants Registration Board’ (NSW Parliament, 
1989c, p. 5785).While the exact reason for this is not clear from the debate, the 
professional accounting bodies may have considered that this step would enhance 
their professional standing through increased professional self-regulation.  
 
At the time of the repeal of the Public Accountants Registration Act, changes were 
also being made to the Corporate Affairs Commission (Auditors and Liquidators) 
Amendment Act, which became the sole registration required for company auditors in 
New South Wales. During the discussion of the repeal of the Public Accountants 
Registration Act and the establishment of the Companies Auditors and Liquidators 
Board (CALDB), it was recorded in Hansard that ‘under the Bill, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants and the Society of Accountants will supervise such 
registration and virtually set the requirements for registration’ (NSW Parliament, 
1989b, p. 6322). This was never the case however, and registration with the CALDB 
is controlled under Section 128 of the Corporations Law. Membership of a 
professional accounting body was not a prerequisite (P. Oakes, personal 
communication, 23 November 1994). 
 
While the professional accounting bodies may have been misled, their action in 
supporting the repeal legislation is consistent with professional organisations’ striving 
for the attainment of self-regulation and claims to autonomy, together with the 
balancing of private and public interest (Gyarmati, 1975; Macdonald, 1985; Parker, 
1994). 
 
The Reality of Nonregulation 
The following cases are representative of the problems facing the accounting 
profession and the general public when unqualified persons, in terms of the former 
public accountant registration requirements, are allowed to provide accounting 
services to the general public or are allowed to continue in public practice following 
blatant exhibitions of improper conduct and complete disregard of acceptable 
standards of professional behaviour. They are not cases relating to public companies 
or statutory authorities, which would have been protected by the CALDB, but 
represent issues relating to the general public.  
 
The first case concerns a member of the then Australian Society of Certified 
Practising Accountants (ASCPA) who had been registered under the Public 
Accountants Registration Act and held a practising certificate from the ASCPA. This 
member was found guilty of fraud involving $1,500,000 relating to the unauthorised 
use of clients’ monies and improper investments. Despite his conviction and forfeiture 
of his society membership he still continued to act as an accountant in public practice. 
The second case involved an ASCPA member, a young woman who, after graduating 
from university and obtaining associate status with the ASCPA, established an 
accounting practice and defrauded the Commonwealth Government of an estimated 
$800,000. She was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment and also forfeited her society 
membership. In a third case, a society member who held himself out to be in public 
practice, without the experience and public practice certificate required by the 
ASCPA, was found guilty of obtaining a financial advantage by deception when he 
misappropriated a client company’s cheque directly into his personal bank account. 
 
In the first case nothing stops the former accountant from starting in business again. 
This compares to the prohibition that would have been placed on him under the Public 
Accountants Registration Act, specifically the requirement to be of good fame and 
character. In the other two cases, under the old legislation neither of the former 
accountants would have been allowed to commence business because they did not 
have the experience required under the Act. While legislation would not necessarily 
have prevented these occurrences (particularly the first case), the old legislation 
would have prevented the accountant in the first case from returning to public 
practice, and would have made it difficult for the accountants in the other two cases 
from commencing public practice.  
 
It is questionable whether the disciplinary action, which can be initiated against a 
member by their particular professional organisation, offers any protection to the 
public. Greater protection would be gained by an attempt to prevent the problems 
outlined above from occurring, rather than exact ineffective disciplinary action after 
the event. Such protection was provided to the public through the Public Accountants 
Registration Act, specifically in the minimum experience requirements and the 
prohibition that, once disqualified, it was no longer possible to provide accounting 
services to the general public.  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter argues that the establishment and the repeal of the Public Accountants 
Registration Act was an example of regulatory capture theory and demonstrated by 
Mitnick’s (1980) identifiable events. It also provides empirical data to support the 
argument that the removal of the universal protection left a gap in the protection 
provided to the general public. The repeal of the Public Accountants Registration Act, 
with the focus on company auditors, completely overlooked the impact this would 
have on the general public, who were left without any legislative protection from 
those offering their accounting services and not members of the professional bodies. It 
also created a loophole which allowed unqualified and professionally disbarred 
individuals to operate with apparent impunity. 
 
Taken together, these events to purportedly achieve government efficiency and 
competition have debased the image of accounting in the minds of the general public 
and possibly destroyed years of professional upgrading by the professional accounting 
bodies. 
 
While governments are unlikely to protect the generic title ‘accountant’, restriction of 
the title ‘public accountant’ previously afforded the general public the protection, to 
some extent, they expect from their elected representatives. Such a direction would be 
consistent with the legal profession, where the generic title ‘lawyer’ indicates a person 
who has graduated in law, while ‘solicitor’ and/or ‘barrister’ are protected titles. 
Similarly the term ‘doctor’ is a generic description with public protection given to the 
protected title ‘registered medical practitioner’.  
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